Model-Targeted Poisoning Attacks: Provable Convergence and Certified
  Bounds by Suya, Fnu et al.
Model-Targeted Poisoning Attacks:
Provable Convergence and Certified Bounds
Fnu Suya∗ Saeed Mahloujifar∗ David Evans Yuan Tian
University of Virginia
{suya,saeed,evans,yt2e}@virginia.edu
Abstract
Machine learning systems that rely on training data collected from untrusted sources
are vulnerable to poisoning attacks, in which adversaries controlling some of the
collected data are able to induce a corrupted model. In this paper, we consider
poisoning attacks where there is an adversary who has a particular target classifier
in mind and hopes to induce a classifier close to that target by adding as few
poisoning points as possible. We propose an efficient poisoning attack based on
online convex optimization. Unlike previous model-targeted poisoning attacks, our
attack comes with provable convergence to any achievable target classifier. The
distance from the induced classifier to the target classifier is inversely proportional
to the square root of the number of poisoning points. We also provide a certified
lower bound on the minimum number of poisoning points needed to achieve a given
target classifier. We report on experiments showing our attack has performance
that is similar to or better than the state-of-the-art attacks in terms of attack success
rate and distance to the target model, while providing the advantages of provable
convergence, and the efficiency benefits associated with being an online attack that
can determine near-optimal poisoning points incrementally.
1 Introduction
Training state-of-the-art machine learning models typically requires a large amount of labeled training
data, which often depends on collecting data and labels from untrusted sources. A typical application
is email spam filtering, where a spam detector filters out spam messages based on features (e.g.,
presence of certain words) and periodically updates the model based on newly received emails labeled
by users. In such a setting, spammers can generate “non-spam” messages by injecting non-related
words or benign words, and when models are trained on these “non-spam” messages, the filtering
accuracy will drop significantly [11]. Such attacks are known as poisoning attacks, and any training
process that collects labels or data from untrusted sources is potentially vulnerable to them.
Poisoning attacks can be categorized into objective-driven attacks and model-targeted attacks de-
pending on whether a target model is considered in the attack process. Objective-driven attacks have
a specific attacker objective and aim to achieve the attack objective by generating the poisoning
points; model-targeted attacks have a specific target classifier in mind and aim to induce that target
classifier by generating minimal number of poisoning points. Objective-driven attacks are most
commonly studied in the existing literature. The attacker objective is typically one of two extremes:
indiscriminate attacks, where the adversary’s goal is simply to decrease the overall accuracy of the
model [2, 26, 18, 24, 9]; and instance-targeted attacks, where the goal is to produce a classifier
that misclassifies a particular known input [21, 29, 8]. Recently, Jagielski et al. introduced a more
realistic attacker objective known as a subpopulation attack, where the goal is to increase the error
rate or obtain a particular output for a defined subpopulation of the data distribution [7]. Attacker
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objectives for realistic attacks are diverse and designing a unified and effective attack strategy for
different attacker objectives is hard. Gradient-based local optimization is most commonly used to
construct poisoning points for a particular attacker objective [2, 26, 18, 8, 21, 29]. Although these
attacks can be modified to fit other attacker objectives, since they are based on local optimization
techniques they can easily get stuck into bad local optima and fail to find effective sets of poisoning
points [24, 9]. To circumvent the issue of local optima, Steinhardt et al. formulate an indiscriminate
attack as a min-max optimization problem and solve it efficiently using online convex optimization
techniques [24]. However, the strong min-max attack only applies to the indiscriminate setting.
In contrast, model-targeted attacks incorporate the attacker objective into a target model and hence,
the target model can reflect any attacker objective. Thus, the same model-targeted attack methods can
be directly applied to a range of indiscriminate and subpopulation attacks just by finding a suitable
target model. Mei et al. first introduced a target model into a poisoning attack [18], but their attack is
still based on gradient-based local optimization techniques and suffers from bad local optima [24, 9].
Koh et al. [9] proposed the KKT attack, which converts the complicated bi-level optimization into a
simple convex optimization problem utilizing the KKT condition, avoiding the local optima issues.
However, their attack only works for a special family of loss functions and does not provide any
guarantee on the number of poisoning points required to converge to the target classifier.
In this work, we focus on the model-targeted attacks and aim to understand the feasibility of a
poisoning adversary to induce any target model. In particular, we find both theoretical and empirical
bounds on the sufficient (and necessary) number of poisoning points to get close to a specific target
classier.
Contributions. Our main contributions involve developing a principled and general model-targeted
poisoning attack strategy, and using it to establish a lower bound on the number of poisoning points
needed to reach a target model. Our poisoning method takes as input a target model, and produces a
set of poisoning points. We prove that the model induced by training on the original training data with
these points added, converges to the target classifier as the number of poison points increases, given
that the loss function is convex and proper regularization is adopted in training (Theorem 4.1). Our
attack works in an online fashion and can incrementally find poisoning points that are nearly optimal.
We then prove a lower bound on the minimum number of poisoning points needed to reach the target
model (Theorem 4.2). Our lower bound is a general result that applies to any loss function. However,
to compute the lower bound efficiently, we need the loss function to be convex. For non-convex
functions, we can still approximate a valid lower bound (Section 4.3). We run experiments to compare
our attack to the state-of-the-art model-targeted attack [9] and find that our attack outperforms it in the
convergence to the target classifier, for all the target classifiers that we tried. Then, we experimentally
evaluate the success rate of our attack, and find that it has superior performance to the best known
attacks in the more realistic subpopulation attack scenario, and comparable performance in the
conventional indiscriminate attack scenario (Section 5).
Comparison to the KKT attack. Our model-targeted attack has several advantages over the state-
of-the-art model-targeted attack, the KKT attack [9]. Our attack comes with a provable guarantee
that it converges to the target classifier, and also provides a certified lower bound on number of
poisoning points needed to reach a given target model. The KKT attack does not provide either of
these guarantees. The convergence property of our attack is applicable to the broader family of convex
loss functions while the validity of the KKT attack is limited to margin based loss functions. From the
practical side, our attack works in an online fashion without needing to know in advance the number of
poisoning points available, and hence is very efficient in incremental poisoning scenario. Empirically,
we also show that our attack has better performance than the KKT attack in the subpopulation attack
settings, and comparable performance in indiscriminate attack settings.
2 Problem Setup
We consider a binary prediction task, h : X → Y , where X ⊆ Rd and Y = {+1,−1}. We note that
the poisoning attack proposed in this paper also applies to multi-class prediction tasks or regression
problems, given some convexity conditions. The prediction model h is characterized by parameters
θ ∈ Θ ⊆ Rd. We define the non-negative convex loss on an individual point, (x, y), as l(θ;x, y)
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(e.g., hinge loss for SVM model). We also define the empirical loss over a set of points A as
L(θ;A) =
∑
(x,y)∈A l(θ;x, y). We assume a true data distribution, p
∗, over X × Y .
We adopt the game-theoretic formalization of the poisoning attack process from Steinhardt et al. [24]
to describe our model-targeted attack scenario:
1. N data points are drawn uniformly at random from p∗ and constitute the clean training set,
Dc.
2. The adversary, with knowledge of Dc, the model training process and the model space Θ,
generates a target classifier θp ∈ Θ that satisfies the attack goal.
3. The adversary produces a set of poisoning points, Dp, with the knowledge of Dc, model
training process, Θ and θp.
4. Model builder trains the model on Dc ∪ Dp and produces a classifier, θatk.
The adversary’s goal is that the resulting classifier, θatk is close to the desired target classifier θp (see
Section 4.2 for distance metric). Step 2 corresponds to the target classifier generation process, and
we simply adopt the heuristic target classifier generation process from Koh et al. [9] and also improve
it for the indiscriminate attack with simple trick (Detail in Appendix C). The target model generation
process from Mei et al. [18] is not used because it is domain specific and is not generally applicable.
Step 3 corresponds to our model-targeted poisoning attack, and is also the main contribution of the
paper.
We also assume the model builder trains a model through the structural empirical risk minimization
and the training process is known to the attacker:
θc = arg min
θ∈Θ
1
|Dc|L(θ;Dc) + CR ·R(θ) (1)
where R(θ) is the regularization function (e.g., 12‖θ‖22 for SVM model).
Remark. As shown in our formalization, we assume an adversary with full knowledge of training
data, model space and training process, as with majority of prior works [1, 18, 24, 9, 21]. The attacker
only adds poisoning points into the training set (addition only attack), instead of modifying existing
training data. Modifying existing points can form stronger attacks than the addition only attack, but
is less practical because the modification typically requires administrative access to the system. We
do not place any restrictions on the poisoning points (e.g., their features and labels), which enables us
to perform the worse case analysis on the robustness of models against poisoning attacks. Although
most previous works do not pose constraint on poisoning points [1, 1, 18, 24, 9], some works also
put different restrictions on attacked points, which will be illustrated in detail in Section 3.
3 Related Work
The most commonly used poisoning strategy is gradient-based attack. Gradient-based attacks
iteratively modify a candidate poisoning point (xˆ, yˆ) in the set Dp based on the test loss defined on
xˆ (keeping yˆ fixed). This kind of attack was first studied on SVM models [2], and later extended
to linear and logistic regression [18], and recently to larger neural network models [8, 28, 19, 21,
29, 6]. In addition to classification tasks, gradient-based poisoning attacks are also applied to topic
modeling [17], collaborative filtering [10] and algorithmic fairness [23]. While most of these works
do not pose restrictions on the poisoning points, some works put various constraints on the poisoning
points. The clean-label attack assumes adversaries can only perturb the features of the data, but the
label is given by an oracle labeler [8, 21, 29, 6]. In label-flipping attack, adversaries are only allowed
to change the labels [1, 26, 27, 7]. These restricted attacks are much weaker than the poisoning
attacks without restrictions [9, 5].
Besides the gradient-based attacks, researchers also utilize generative adversarial networks to craft
poisoning points efficiently for larger neural networks, however, the effectiveness of the attack is
limited [28, 20]. The strongest attacks so far are the KKT attack [9] and the min-max attack [24, 9].
However, the KKT attack cannot scale for multi-class classification tasks, not suitable for broader
family of loss functions. The min-max attack only works for indiscriminate attack setting, but
additionally provides a certificate on worst case test loss (with fixed number of poisoning points),
and our theoretical lower bound on number of poisons can treated as its dual problem. We are also
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inspired by Steinhardt et al. [24] to adopt online convex optimization to instantiate our model-targeted
attack, but now deals more general attack scenario. We also distinguish ourselves from the poisoning
attack against online learning [25]. The attack against online learning considers a setting where
training data arrives in a streaming manner while we consider the offline setting with training data
being fixed. Another line of work studies provable “targeted” poisoning attacks where an adversary
tries to increase the probability of an arbitrary “bad” property [14, 13, 15]. We are distinct from these
works in that our attack tries to enforce a specific classifier, and not a bad property. Also, our attack
could achieve its goal more efficiently, while still having provable guarantees2.
4 Poisoning Attack with a Target Model
Our new poisoning attack determines a target model and selects poisoning points to achieve that target
model. The target models are generated in a heuristic manner and we adopt the heuristic approach
proposed by Koh et al. [9] and improve it for indiscriminate attack with simple trick. For the new
poisoning attack, first, we show the algorithm that generates the poisoning points in Section 4.1 and
then prove that the generated poisoning points, once added to the clean data, can produce a classifier
that asymptotically converges to the target classifier in Section 4.2.
4.1 Model-Targeted Poisoning with Online Learning
The main idea of our model-targeted poisoning attack, as outlined in Algorithm 1, is to sequentially
add a point into the training set that have maximum loss difference between the intermediate model
obtained so far and the target model, and by training models on the updated training set, we actually
minimize the gap in the loss of the intermediate classifier and the target classifier. Repeating the
process then eventually generates classifiers that have similar loss distribution as the target classifier.
We show in Section 4.2 why similar loss distribution implies convergence.
Algorithm 1 ModelTargetedPoisoning
Input: Dc, the loss functions (L and l), θp
Output: Dp
1: Dp = ∅
2: while stop criteria not met do
3: θt = arg maxL(θ;Dc ∪ Dp)
4: (x∗, y∗) = arg maxX×Y l(θt;x, y)− l(θp;x, y)
5: Dp = Dp ∪ {(x∗, y∗)}
6: end while
7: return Dp
Algorithm 1 requires the input of clean training set Dc, the Loss function (L for set of points and
l for individual point) and the target model θp. The output from Algorithm 1 will be the set of
poisoning points Dp. The algorithm is simple: first, adversaries train the intermediate model θt on
the mixture of clean and poisoning points Dc ∪ Dp with Dp an empty set in first iteration (Line 3).
The adversary then searches for the point that maximizes the loss difference between θt and θp (Line
4). After the point of maximum loss difference is found, it is added to the poisoning set Dp (Line
5). The whole process repeats until the stop condition is satisfied in Line 2. The stop condition is
flexible and it can take various forms: 1) adversary has a budget T on number of poisoning points,
and the algorithm halts when the algorithm runs for T iterations; 2) the intermediate classifier θt is
closer to the target classifier (than a preset threshold ) in terms of the maximum loss difference, and
more details regarding this distance metric will be introduced in Section 4.2; 3) adversary has some
requirement on the accuracy and the algorithm terminates when θt satisfies the accuracy requirement.
Since we focus on producing a classifier close to the target model, we adopt the second stop criteria
that measures the distance with respect to the maximum loss difference, and report results based on
this criteria in Section 5.
A nice property of Algorithm 1 is that the classifier θatk trained on Dc ∪ Dp is close to the target
model θp and asymtotically converges to θp. Details of the convergence will be shown in the next
2Although the provable attacks [14, 15] are shown to be polynomial time [12, 4], they are still far from
practical.
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section. The algorithm may appear to be slow, particularly for larger models due to requirement of
repeatedly training a model in line 3. However, this is not an issue. First, as will be shown in next
section, the algorithm is an online optimization process and line 3 corresponds to solving the online
optimization problem exactly. However, people often use the very efficient online gradient descent
method to approximately solve the problem and its asymptotic performance is the same [22]. Second,
when we solve the optimization problem exactly, we can add multiple copies of (x∗, y∗) into Dp each
time. This reduces the overall iteration number, and hence reduces the number of times retraining
models. The proof of convergence will be similar. For simplicity in interpreting the results, we do
not use this in our experiments and add only one copy of (x∗, y∗) each iteration. However, we also
tested the performance by adding two copies of (x∗, y∗) and find that the attack results are nearly the
same while the efficiency being significantly improved. For example, for the experiments we tried on
MNIST-17 dataset, by adding 2 copies of points, with similar number of poisoning points, the attack
success rate decreases at most by 0.7% while the execution time is reduced approximately by half.
4.2 Convergence of Our Poisoning Attack
Before proving the convergence of Algorithm 1, we need to measure the distance of the model θatk
trained on Dc ∪ Dp to the target model θp. First, we define a general closeness measure based on
their prediction performance which we will use to state our convergence theorem:
Definition 1 (Loss-based distance). For two models θ1 and θ2, a space X × Y and a loss function
l(θ;x, y), we define loss-based distance Dl,X ,Y : Θ×Θ→ R as
Dl,X ,Y(θ1, θ2) = max
(x,y)∈X×Y
l(θ1;x, y)− l(θ2;x, y).
Why is loss-based distance a meaningful notion of closeness? We argue that this notion captures
the “behavorial” distance between two models. Namely, if θ1 is -close (as measured by loss-based
distance) to θ2 and vice versa, then θ1 and θ2 would have almost equal loss on all the points, meaning
that they have almost the same behavior across all the space. Note that our definition of distance does
not have the symmetry property of metrics and hence is not a metric. However, it has some other
properties of metrics in the space of attainable models. For example, if some model θ is attainable,
no model could have negative distance to it. To further show the value of this distance notion, in
Appendix B we demonstrate an O() upper bound on the `1 norm of difference between two models
that are -close with respect to loss-based distance for the special case of Hinge loss.
Our convergence theorem uses the loss-based distance to establish that the attack of Algorithm 1
converges to the target classifier:
Theorem 4.1. After T steps, Algorithm 1 will produce the poisoning set Dp and the classifier trained
on Dc ∪ Dp is -close to θp, with respect to loss-based distance, Dl,X ,Y , for
 =
α(T ) + L(θp;Dc)− L(θc;Dc)
T · γ
where, γ is a universal constant determined only by the regularization factor CR and α(T ) is the
regret of the online algorithm when the loss function used for training is convex. Additionally, α(T )
is in the order of O(log T ) and we have  ≤ O( log TT ) when the regularizer R(θ) is strongly convex,
and → 0 when T → +∞.
Remark 1. α(T ) is also in the order of O(log T ) when the loss function used for training is strongly
convex and the regularizer is convex.
Proof idea. The full proof of Theorem 4.1 is in Appendix A. Here, we only summarize the high level
proof idea. The key idea is to frame the poisoning problem as an online learning problem. In this
formulation, each step of the online learning problem corresponds to the ith poison point (xi, yi). In
particular, the loss function at iteration i of the online learning problem is set to l(·;xi, yi). Then,
we show that by defining the parameters of the online learning problem in a careful way, the output
of the follow-the-leader (FTL) algorithm [22] at iteration i is a model that is identical to training a
model on a dataset consisting of the clean points and the first i− 1 poisoning points. On the other
hand, the way the poisoning points are selected, we can show that at the ith iteration the maximum
loss difference between the target model and the best induced model so far would be smaller than the
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regret of the FTL algorithm divided by the number of poisoning points. The convergence bound of
Theorem 4.1 boils down to regret analysis of the algorithm based on the loss function. Since we are
assuming the loss function is convex with a strongly convex regularizer (or a strongly convex loss
function with a convex regularizer), we can show that the regret is bounded by O(log T ) and hence
the loss distance between the induced model and the target model converges to 0.
Implications of Theorem 4.1 The theorem says that the loss-based distance of the model trained
on Dc ∪ Dp to the target model correlates to the loss difference between the target model and the
clean model θc (trained on Dc) on Dc, and correlates inversely with the number of poisoning points.
In other words, if the target classifier θp is closer to the clean model θc (in terms of the loss on clean
training data), then it is easier to achieve the target classifier. On the other hand, with more poisoning
points, we can get closer to the target classifier, and our attack will be more effective. The theorem
justifies the motivation behind the heuristic method [9] to select a target classifier with lower loss
on clean data. For the indiscriminate attack scenario, we also improve the heuristic approach by
adaptively updating the model and producing target classifiers with much lower loss on the clean
set. This helps to empirically confirm our theorem. Details of the original and improved heuristic
approach, and relevant experiments are in Appendix C.
4.3 Certified Lower Bound on the Number of poisoning Points
In this section, we first provide the theoretical lower bound on number of poisoning points required
for producing the target classifier, and then explain how the lower bound estimation scheme can be
incorporated into Algorithm 1.
Considering the learning problem defined in (1), in the theorem below, we show the minimum number
of poisoning points required to produce θp in the addition only poisoning scenario. The intuition
behind the theorem is, when the number of poisoning points added to the clean training set is smaller
than the certified lower bound, there always exists a classifier θ that has lower loss compared to θp
and hence the target classifier cannot be achieved.
Theorem 4.2 (Certified Lower Bound). Given a target classifier θp, to reproduce θp by adding the
poisoning set Dp into Dc, the number of poisoning points |Dp| cannot be lower than
sup
θ
c(θ) =
L(θp;Dc)− L(θ;Dc) +NCR(R(θp)−R(θ))
supx,y
(
l(θ;x, y)− l(θp;x, y)
)
+ CR(R(θ)−R(θp))
.
Remark 2. To obtain the actual value of the lower bound to achieve θp, one just needs to replace θ
with a known classifier. One easy choice is to replace θ with model θc trained on Dc.
Remark 3. Our theorem also applies to non-convex functions. However, in order to efficiently find
the point with maximum loss difference for the non-convex scenario, one can use a convex function
to upper bound the loss function difference and efficiently compute a conservative lower bound.
The formula for the lower bound can be easily incorporated into Algorithm 1 to obtain tighter
theoretical lower bound. We simply need to check all of the intermediate classifier θt produced during
the attack process and replace θ with θt. As long as L(θp;Dc)−L(θt;Dc)+NCR(R(θp)−R(θt)) >
0, the lower bound can be computed for the pair of θt and θp. Algorithm 1 then has an additionally
returns the lower bound, which is the highest lower bound computed from our poisoning procedure.
5 Experiments
We first describe our experimental setup regarding the datasets, models, attacks and target classifiers
for the attacks. Next, we present the experimental results by showing the convergence of Algorithm 1,
the comparison of attack success rates to state-of-the-art poisoning attacks, and the theoretical lower
bound for reaching a given target classifier and its gap to the number of poisoning points. The code
for evaluation is available at: https://github.com/suyeecav/model-targeted-poisoning.
We are most interested in subpopulation attacks, since they correspond to the more realistic attacker
goal of impacting the classifier outputs for a targeted subpopulation. For completeness, we also
evaluate our attack in the indiscriminate poisoning scenario but defer details on those experiments to
Appendix C. Our findings for the indiscriminate attacks are that the attack gradually and consistently
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converges to the target model in terms of the maximum loss difference and the Euclidean distance
to the target, with attack success rates that are comparable to the state-of-the-art attack (unlike the
subpopulation attacks, where our attack produces superior results).
Dataset, Model and Attacks. For the subpopulation attack experiments, we use the Adult dataset [3].
This dataset was used for evaluation by the first subpopulation attack paper [7] and we directly use
Jagielski et al.’s preprocessed version of the dataset. We conduct experiments on linear SVM model
and compare our model-targeted poisoning attack in Algorithm 1 to the state-of-the-art KKT attack [9].
We do not include the model-targeted attack from Mei et al. [18] because it underperforms the KKT
attack [9]. We also do not include objective-driven attacks because the attack goals are significantly
different between the model-targeted and objective-driven attacks. However, model-targeted attacks
can be compared to objective-driven attacks relatively fairly when some proper target models are
provided. We provide more discussions on this in Appendix D.
Both our attack and the KKT attack take as input a target classifier and the original training data,
and output a set of poisoning points selected with the goal that the induced classifier is as close as
possible to the target classifier. We compare the effectiveness of the attacks in selecting poisoning
points that converge to a given target classifier by testing the attacks using the same target model.
The KKT attack requires a target number of poisoning points as an input while our attack is more
flexible and can either take a target number of poisoning points or a threshold for -close distance to
the target model. Since we do not know the number of poisoning points needed to reach some attacker
goal in advance for the KKT attack, we first run our attack and produce a classifier that satisfies the
selected -close distance threshold. The loss function is set as the hinge loss since we target an SVM
model in our experiments and we set  = 0.01 for all these experiments. Then, we use the size of the
poisoning set returned from our attack (denoted by np) as the input to the KKT attack for the target
number of poisons needed. We also compare the two attacks with varying numbers of poisoning
points up to np. For the KKT attack, its entire optimization process must be rerun whenever the
target number of poisoning points changes. Hence, it is infeasible to evaluate the KKT attack on
many different poisoning set sizes. In our experiments, we run the KKT attack five poisoning set
sizes: 0.2 · np, 0.4 · np, 0.6 · np, 0.8 · np, and np. In contrast, we simply run our attack for iterations
up to the maximum number of poisoning points, collecting a data point for iteration up to np.
Subpopulations. We identify the subpopulations for the Adult dataset using k-means clustering
techniques (ClusterMatch [7]) to obtain different clusters (k = 20 in our case). For each cluster,
we select instances with label “<=50K” to form the subpopulation (indicating all instances in the
subpopulation are in low income group). This way of defining subpopulation is rather arbitrary (in
constrast to a more likely attack goal which would select subpopulations based on demographic
characteristics), but enables us to simplify the analysis. From the 20 subpopulations obtained, we
select three subpopulations with the highest test accuracy on the clean model and they all have
100% test accuracy, indicating all instances in these subpopulations are correctly classified as low
income. This enables us to use “attack success rate” and “accuracy” without any ambiguity on the
subpopulation—for each of our subpopulations, all instances are originally classified as low income,
and the simulated attacker’s goal is to have them classified as high income. For each subpopulation,
we use the heuristic approach from Koh et al. [9] to generate a target classifier that that has 0%
accuracy (100% attacker success) on the subpopulation, indicating that all subpopulation instances
are now classified as high income.
Convergence. Figure 1 shows the convergence of Algorithm 1 using both maximum loss difference
and Euclidean distance to the target. The maximum number of poisons (np) for the experiments is
obtained when the classifier from Algorithm 1 is 0.01-close to the target classifier. Our attack steadily
reduces the maximum loss difference and Euclidean distance to the target model, in contrast to the
KKT attack which does not seem to converge towards the target model reliably. Concretely, at the
maximum number of poisons in Figure 1, both the maximum loss difference and Euclidean distance
of our attack (to the target) is less than 2% of the corresponding distances of the KKT attack.
Attack Success. Next, we compare the classifiers induced by the two attacks in terms of the attacker’s
goal of reducing the test accuracy on the subpopulation. Figure 2 shows the accuracy results for the
three subpopulations. For each test, the maximum number of poisoning points is obtained by running
our attack with a target of 0.01-closeness (in loss based distance). For the three subpopulations, at
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(a) Max Loss Difference to Target (b) Euclidean Distance to Target
Figure 1: Attack convergence (results shown are for the first subpopulation, Cluster 0). The maximum
number of poisons is set using the 0.01-close threshold to target classifier.
(a) Cluster 0 (b) Cluster 1 (c) Cluster 2
Figure 2: Test accuracy for each subpopulation with classifiers induced by poisoning points obtained
from our attack and the KKT attack.
Cluster 0 Cluster 1 Cluster 2
# of Poisons 1866 2097 2163.3 ± 2.5
Lower Bound 1666.7 ± 2.4 1831.4 ± 5.0 1863.0 ± 9.2
Table 1: Theoretical lower bounds on the number of poisoning points needed to achieve classifiers
induced from our attack for different subpopulations. All results are averaged over 4 runs, integer
value in the cell means we get exactly same value for 4 runs and others are shown with the average
and standard error.
the maximum number of poisons, our attack is much more successful than the KKT attack—the
induced classifiers have 0.5% accuracy compared to 15.4% accuracy for KKT on subpopulation 1,
0.0% compared to 6.9% on subpoulation 2, and 0.3% compared to 20.1% on subpoplation 3.
Near Optimality of Our Attack. In order to show the optimality of our attack, we calculate a lower
bound on the number of poisoning points needed to induce the model that is induced by the poisoning
points that are found by our attack. We calculate this lower bound on the number of poisons using
Theorem 4.2 (details in Section 4.3). Note that Theorem 4.2 provides a valid lower bound based on
any intermediate model. In order to get a lower bound on the number of poisoning points, we only
need to use Theorem 4.2 on some number of intermediate models and report the best one. We do
this is by running Algorithm 1 using the induced model (and not the previous target model) as the
target model, terminating when the induced classifier is 0.01-close to the given target model. We then
consider all the intermediate classifiers that the algorithm induced across the iterations. The Adult
dataset contains many binary features and hence the search process for the point with maximum loss
difference is a (non-convex) mixed integer programming problem. To obtain a valid lower bound,
we relax the binary features into real valued features in range [0, 1] and then compute the lower
bound. Our calculated lower bound shows that in some cases the gap between the lower bound
and the number of used poison points is small. This means our attack is nearly optimal in terms of
minimizing the number of poisoning points needed to induce a target classifier.
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6 Conclusion
We propose a general poisoning framework with provable guarantees to reach any achievable target
classifier, along with certified lower bound on the number of poisoning points needed. Our attack
is a generic tool that first captures the goal of the adversary as a target model, and then focuses
on the power of the attack to induce that model. This separation enables future work to explore
the effectiveness of poisoning attacks corresponding to different adversarial goals. Our framework
also applies in scenarios where adversaries can first remove points and then add new points into
the training set. We have not considered defenses in this work, and it is important to study the
effectiveness of our attack against data poisoning defenses. Defenses may be designed the limit the
search space of the points with maximum loss difference, increasing the number of poisoning points
needed.
One limitation of our framework is the requirement in the convexity of the difference of loss
functions to efficiently search for its maximum value, which excludes other commonly used loss
functions such as logistic loss. However, our approach might still be effective in these cases by
using local optimization techniques to search for poisoning points with maximum loss difference.
The convergence property of our attack holds for any convex loss function with bounded Lipschitz
constant and the convergence does not depend on the loss difference to be convex.
References
[1] B. Biggio, B. Nelson, and P. Laskov. Support vector machines under adversarial label noise. In
Asian Conference on Machine Learning, 2011.
[2] B. Biggio, B. Nelson, and P. Laskov. Poisoning attacks against support vector machines. arXiv
preprint arXiv:1206.6389, 2012.
[3] D. Dua and C. Graff. UCI Machine Learning Repository, 2017. URL http://archive.ics.
uci.edu/ml.
[4] O. Etesami, S. Mahloujifar, and M. Mahmoody. Computational concentration of measure:
Optimal bounds, reductions, and more. In ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms,
2020.
[5] S. Hong, V. Chandrasekaran, Y. Kaya, T. Dumitras¸, and N. Papernot. On the effectiveness
of mitigating data poisoning attacks with gradient shaping. arXiv preprint arXiv:2002.11497,
2020.
[6] W. R. Huang, J. Geiping, L. Fowl, G. Taylor, and T. Goldstein. Metapoison: Practical general-
purpose clean-label data poisoning. arXiv preprint arXiv:2004.00225, 2020.
[7] M. Jagielski, P. Hand, and A. Oprea. Subpopulation data poisoning attacks. In NeurIPS 2019
Workshop on Robust AI in Financial Services, 2019.
[8] P. W. Koh and P. Liang. Understanding black-box predictions via influence functions. In
International Conference on Machine Learning, 2017.
[9] P. W. Koh, J. Steinhardt, and P. Liang. Stronger data poisoning attacks break data sanitization
defenses. arXiv preprint arXiv:1811.00741, 2018.
[10] B. Li, Y. Wang, A. Singh, and Y. Vorobeychik. Data poisoning attacks on factorization-based
collaborative filtering. In NeurIPS, 2016.
[11] D. Lowd and C. Meek. Adversarial learning. In ACM SIGKDD Conference on Knowledge
Discovery in Data Mining, 2005.
[12] S. Mahloujifar and M. Mahmoody. Can adversarially robust learning leverage computational
hardness? arXiv preprint arXiv:1810.01407, 2018.
[13] S. Mahloujifar, D. I. Diochnos, and M. Mahmoody. Learning under p-tampering attacks. arXiv
preprint arXiv:1711.03707, 2017.
[14] S. Mahloujifar, D. I. Diochnos, and M. Mahmoody. The curse of concentration in robust
learning: Evasion and poisoning attacks from concentration of measure. In AAAI Conference
on Artificial Intelligence, 2019.
[15] S. Mahloujifar, M. Mahmoody, and A. Mohammed. Universal multi-party poisoning attacks. In
International Conference on Machine Learning, 2019.
9
[16] H. B. McMahan. A survey of algorithms and analysis for adaptive online learning. The Journal
of Machine Learning Research, 18(1):3117–3166, 2017.
[17] S. Mei and X. Zhu. The security of Latent Dirichlet Allocation. In Artificial Intelligence and
Statistics, pages 681–689, 2015.
[18] S. Mei and X. Zhu. Using machine teaching to identify optimal training-set attacks on machine
learners. In AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2015.
[19] L. Muñoz-González, B. Biggio, A. Demontis, A. Paudice, V. Wongrassamee, E. C. Lupu, and
F. Roli. Towards poisoning of deep learning algorithms with back-gradient optimization. In
ACM Workshop on Artificial Intelligence and Security, 2017.
[20] L. Muñoz-González, B. Pfitzner, M. Russo, J. Carnerero-Cano, and E. C. Lupu. Poisoning
attacks with generative adversarial nets. arXiv preprint arXiv:1906.07773, 2019.
[21] A. Shafahi, W. R. Huang, M. Najibi, O. Suciu, C. Studer, T. Dumitras, and T. Goldstein. Poison
frogs! targeted clean-label poisoning attacks on neural networks. In NeurIPS, 2018.
[22] S. Shalev-Shwartz. Online learning and online convex optimization. Foundations and Trends in
Machine Learning, 4(2):107–194, 2012.
[23] D. Solans, B. Biggio, and C. Castillo. Poisoning attacks on algorithmic fairness. arXiv preprint
arXiv:2004.07401, 2020.
[24] J. Steinhardt, P. W. W. Koh, and P. S. Liang. Certified defenses for data poisoning attacks. In
NeurIPS, 2017.
[25] Y. Wang and K. Chaudhuri. Data poisoning attacks against online learning. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1808.08994, 2018.
[26] H. Xiao, H. Xiao, and C. Eckert. Adversarial label flips attack on support vector machines. In
European Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2012.
[27] H. Xiao, B. Biggio, B. Nelson, H. Xiao, C. Eckert, and F. Roli. Support vector machines under
adversarial label contamination. Neurocomputing, 160:53–62, 2015.
[28] C. Yang, Q. Wu, H. Li, and Y. Chen. Generative poisoning attack method against neural
networks. arXiv preprint arXiv:1703.01340, 2017.
[29] C. Zhu, W. R. Huang, A. Shafahi, H. Li, G. Taylor, C. Studer, and T. Goldstein. Transferable
clean-label poisoning attacks on deep neural nets. arXiv preprint arXiv:1905.05897, 2019.
10
A Proof of Main Theorems
In this section, we provide the proofs of the main theorems shown in this paper. For convenience, we
restate all the theorems below while also referencing to the main paper.
Before proving the main theorem, we introduce two new definitions and several lemmas to assist with
the proof.
Definition 2 (Attainable models). We say θ is CR-attainable with respect to loss function l and
regularization function R if there exists a training set D such that
θ = arg min
θ∈Θ
1
|D| · L(θ;D) + CR ·R(θ)
Lemma A.1. Let θ1 and θ2 be two CR-attainable parameters for some CR > 0 such that R(θ1) >
R(θ2). Then,
sup
x,y
(
l(θ2;x, y)− l(θ1;x, y)
)
/
(
R(θ1)−R(θ2)
)
> CR.
Proof. Consider any attainable pairs of (θ1, θ2) such that R(θ1) > R(θ2) and let D1 to be training
set that the training algorithm produces the unique minimizer θ1. Namely,
θ1 = arg min
θ
1
|D1| · L(θ;D1) + CR ·R(θ)
Since θ1 minimizes the total loss on D1 uniquely, we have
1
|D1|L(θ2;D1) + CR ·R(θ2) >
1
|D1|L(θ1;D1) + CR ·R(θ1)
By rearranging the above inequality and by an averaging argument, we have
sup
x,y
(
l(θ2;x, y)− l(θ1;x, y)
) ≥ 1|D1|L(θ2;D1)− 1|D1|L(θ1;D1) > CR · (R(θ1)−R(θ2)).
Now since R(θ1) > R(θ2) we have
sup
x,y
(
l(θ2;x, y)− l(θ1;x, y)
)
/
(
R(θ1)−R(θ2)
)
> CR.
Lemma A.2. Let F be the family of all CR-attainable models. For any (θ1, θ2) ∈ F 2, we have
sup
x,y
(
l(θ2;x, y)− l(θ1;x, y)
)
+ CR(R(θ2)−R(θ1)) > γ · sup
x,y
(
l(θ2;x, y)− l(θ1;x, y)
)
where γ is a positive constant that only depends on CR.
Proof. We prove the lemma for γ = 1− CR/C for
C =
 inf
(θ1,θ2)∈F 2
s.t. R(θ1)>R(θ2)
sup
x,y
(l(θ2;x, y)− l(θ1;x, y))/(R(θ1 −R(θ2))
 .
First, note that by Lemma A.1 we have
C > CR > 0. (2)
which implies γ is positive. Now we consider two subcases based on the sign of R(θ2)−R(θ1):
Case 1: R(θ2)−R(θ1) ≥ 0. In this case the inequality is straightforward:
sup
x,y
(
l(θ2;x, y)− l(θ1;x, y)
)
+ CR · (R(θ2)−R(θ1)) ≥ sup
x,y
(
l(θ2;x, y)− l(θ1;x, y)
)
> (1− CR/C) · sup
x,y
(
l(θ2;x, y)− l(θ1;x, y)
)
,
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where the last inequality is based on (2).
Case 2: R(θ2)−R(θ1) < 0. From the definition of C we have
R(θ1)−R(θ2) ≤
supx,y
(
l(θ2;x, y)− l(θ1;x, y)
)
C
.
Equivalently, we can say
R(θ2)−R(θ1) ≥ −
supx,y
(
l(θ2;x, y)− l(θ1;x, y)
)
C
.
Replacing R(θ2)−R(θ1) with the lower bound above completes the proof, namely
sup
x,y
(
l(θ2;x, y)− l(θ1;x, y)
)
+CR(R(θ2)−R(θ1)) ≥ (1−CR/C) · sup
x,y
(
l(θ2;x, y)− l(θ1;x, y)
)
.
With Definition 2 and the lemmas, we are ready to prove the theorem on convergence of Algorithm 1
(restating Theorem 4.1, from Section 4.2):
Theorem 4.1. After T steps, Algorithm 1 will produce the poisoning set Dp and the classifier trained
on Dc ∪ Dp is -close to θp, with respect to loss-based distance, Dl,X ,Y , for
 =
α(T ) + L(θp;Dc)− L(θc;Dc)
T · γ
where, γ is a universal constant determined only by the regularization factor CR and α(T ) is the
regret of the online algorithm when the loss function used for training is convex. Additionally, α(T )
is in the order of O(log T ) and we have  ≤ O( log TT ) when the regularizer R(θ) is strongly convex,
and → 0 when T → +∞.
The goal of the adversary is to get -close to θp (in terms of the loss based distance) by injecting
(potentially few) number of poisoned training data. The algorithm is in essence an online learning
problem and we transform Algorithm 1 into the form of standard online learning problem and then
utilize existing regret bounds to show the convergence.
We adopt the follow the leader (FTL) framework to describe Algorithm 1 in the language of standard
online learning problem and derive the desired logarithmic regret bound based on strong convexity of
the loss function. We first describe the online learning setting considered in this paper and the notion
of the regret.
Definition 3. Let L be a class of loss functions, Θ set of possible models, A : (Θ × L)∗ → Θ an
online learner and S : (Θ× L)∗ ×Θ→ L a strategy for picking loss functions in different rounds
of online learning (adversarial environment in the context of online convex optimization). We use
Regret(A,S, T ) to denote the regret of A against S, in T rounds. Namely,
Regret(A,S, T ) =
T∑
j=0
lj(θj)−min
θ∈Θ
T∑
j=0
lj(θ)
where
θi = A
(
(θ0, l0), . . . , (θi−1, li−1)
)
and li = S
(
(θ0, l0), . . . , (θi−1, li−1), θi
)
.
With the online learning problem set up, we proceed to the main proof which first describes Algo-
rithm 1 in the FTL framework and then shows the convergence utilizing the logarithmic regret bound
of the FTL framework.
Proof of Theorem 4.1. The FTL framework proceeds by solving all the functions incurred during the
previous online optimization steps, namely, AFTL((θ0, l0), . . . , (θi, li)) = arg minθ∈Θ
∑i
j=0 li(θ).
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Next, we describe how we design the ith loss function li in each round of the online optimization.
For the first choice, AFTL chooses a random model θ0 ∈ Θ. In the first round (round 0), Sθp uses the
clean training set Dc and the loss is set as
Sθp(θ0) = l0(θ) = L(θ;Dc) +N · CR ·R(θ).
According to the FTL framework, AFTL returns model that minimizes the loss on the clean training
set Dc using the structural empirical risk minimization. For the subsequent iterations (i ≥ 1), the
loss functions is defined as, given the latest model θi, Sθp first finds (x
∗
i , y
∗
i ) that maximizes the loss
difference between θi and a target model θp. Namely,
(x∗i , y
∗
i ) = arg max
(x,y)
l(θi;x, y)− l(θp;x, y)
and then chooses the ith loss function as follows:
Sθp
(
(θ0, l0), . . . , (θi−1, li−1), θi
)
= li(θ) = l(θ;x
∗
i , y
∗
i ) + CR ·R(θ).
Now we will see how FTL framework behaves when working on these loss functions at different
iterations. We use Dip to denote the set {(x∗1, y∗1), . . . , (x∗i , y∗i )}. We have
θi = AFTL((θ0, l0), . . . , (θi−1, li−1)) = arg min
θ∈Θ
i−1∑
j=0
lj(θ)
= arg min
θ∈Θ
L(θ;Dc) +N · CR ·R(θ)
+
i−1∑
j=1
l(θ;x∗i , y
∗
i ) + CR ·R(θ)
= arg min
θ∈Θ
L(θ;Dc ∪ Di−1p ) + (N + i− 1) · CR ·R(θ)
= arg min
θ∈Θ
1
|Dc ∪ Di−1p |
L(θ;Dc ∪ Di−1p ) + CR ·R(θ)
This means that AFTL algorithm, at each step, trains a new model over the combination of clean
data and poison data so far (i − 1 number of poisons). Now we want to see what is the transla-
tion of the Regret(AFTL, Sθp , T ). If we can prove an upper bound on regret, namely if we show
Regret(AFTL, Sθp , T ) ≤ α(T ) for some function α, then we have
T∑
j=0
lj(θj)−
T∑
j=0
lj(θp) ≤
T∑
j=0
lj(θj)−min
θ∈Θ
T∑
j=0
lj(θ) ≤ α(T )
which implies
T∑
j=0
lj(θj)−
T∑
j=0
lj(θp) = L(θc;Dc)− L(θp;Dc) +N · CR · (R(θc)−R(θp))
+
T∑
j=1
lj(θj)−
T∑
j=1
lj(θp)
= L(θc;Dc)− L(θp;Dc) +N · CR · (R(θc)−R(θp))
+
T∑
j=1
[
max
x,y
(
l(θj ;x, y)− l(θp;x, y)
)
+ CR · (R(θj)−R(θp))
]
≤ α(T )
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Therefore we have
T∑
j=1
[
max
x,y
(
l(θj ;x, y)− l(θp;x, y)
)
+ CR · (R(θj)−R(θp))
] ≤ α(T ) + L(θp;Dc)− L(θc;Dc)
+N · CR · (R(θp)−R(θc))
Based on Lemma A.2, we further have
T∑
j=1
γ · (max
x,y
l(θj ;x, y)− l(θp;x, y)
) ≤ α(T ) + L(θp;Dc)− L(θc;Dc)
+N · CR · (R(θp)−R(θc))
Above inequality states that average of the maximum loss difference in all previous rounds is bounded
from above. Therefore, using averaging argument, there exist j ∈ [T ] such that the maximum loss
difference θj is -close to θp with respect to the loss based distance where
 =
α(T ) + L(θp;Dc)− L(θc;Dc) +N · CR · (R(θp)−R(θc))
T · γ .
The Theorem states the convergence to the target classifier θp (in terms of loss based distance) by
showing that  ≤ O( log TT ), where → 0 when T → +∞. Since L(θc;Dc)− L(θp;Dc) is fixed, to
show  ≤ O( log TT ), we only need to show α(T ) ≤ O(log T ).
Our FTL framework formulation can utilize the existing logarithmic regret bound of adaptive FTL
algorithm when the objective functions are strongly convex with respect to some norm ‖ · ‖, as
illustrated in Section 3.7 in McMahan et al. [16]. For clarity in presentation, we restate their related
results below.
Setting 1 (Setting 1 in McMahan et al. [16]). Given a sequence of objective loss functions f1, f2, ..., fi
and a sequence of incremental regularization functions r0, r1, ..., ri we consider an algorithm that
selects the response point based on
θ1 = arg min
θ∈Rd
r0(θ)
θi+1 = arg min
θ∈Rd
i∑
j=1
fj(θ) + rj(θ) + r0(θ), for i = 1, 2, ...
We simplify the summation notation with f1:i(θ) =
∑i
j=1 fj(θ). Assume that ri is a convex function
and satisfy ri(θ) ≥ 0 for i ∈ {0, 1, 2, ...}, against a sequence of convex loss functions fi : Rd →
R ∪ {∞}. Further, letting h0:i = r0:i + f1:i we assume dom h0:i is non-empty. Recalling θi =
arg minθ h0:i−1(θ), we further assume ∂fi(θi) is non-empty. We denote the dual norm of a norm‖ · ‖ as ‖ · ‖∗.
Theorem A.3 (Restatement of Theorem 1 in McMahan et al. [16]). Consider Setting 1, and suppose
the ri are chosen such that r0:i + f1:i+1 is 1-strongly-convex w.r.t. some norm ‖ · ‖(i)·. If we define
the regret of the algorithm with respect to a selected point θ∗ as
RegretT (θ
∗, fi) ≡
T∑
i=1
fi(θi)−
T∑
i=1
fi(θ
∗).
Then, for any θ∗ ∈ Rd and for any T > 0, with gi ∈ ∂fi(θi), we have
RegretT (θ
∗, fi) ≤ r0:T−1(θ∗) + 1
2
‖gi‖2(i−1),∗
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Corollary A.3.1 (Formalization of FTL result in McMahan et al. [16]). In the FTL framework (no
regularizers are used in the optimization procedure), suppose each loss function fi is 1-strongly
convex w.r.t. a norm ‖ · ‖, then we have
RegretT (θ
∗, fi) ≤ 1
2
T∑
i=1
1
i
‖gi‖2∗ ≤
G2
2
(1 + log T )
with ‖gi‖∗ ≤ G.
Proof. The proof basically follows from Theorem A.3. Since we are considering the FTL framework,
let ri(θ) = 0 for all i and define ‖θ‖(i) =
√
i‖θ‖. Observe that h0:i is 1-strongly convex w.r.t. ‖θ‖(i)
and based on Lemma 3 in McMahan et al. [16], ‖θ‖(i),∗ = 1√i‖θ‖∗. Then by applying Theorem A.3,
we have
RegretT (θ
∗, fi) ≤ 1
2
T∑
i=1
‖gi‖2(i),∗ =
1
2
T∑
i=1
1
i
‖gi‖2∗
Based on the inequality of
∑T
i=1 1/i ≤ 1 + log T and if we further assume ‖gi‖∗ ≤ G, then we can
have
1
2
T∑
i=1
1
i
‖gi‖2∗ ≤
G2
2
(1 + log T )
The logarithmic regret of Regret(AFTL, Sθp , T ) of our algorithm then naturally follows from the
result of RegretT (θ
∗, fi) in Corollary A.3.1. Specifically, based on the assumption, the objective
function li in our algorithm are 1-strongly convex with respect to a norm ‖ · ‖ (l0 is an exception
that is
√
N -strongly convex, but does not impact the subsequent results on l0:i) and therefore l0:i is
1-strongly convex to norm ‖ · ‖i =
√
N + i‖ · ‖. The norm of the gradient gi ∈ ∂li is also bounded
in practice. For example, in the case of Hinge loss and `2-regularizer for the SVM model, ‖gi‖2 is
bounded by the Lipschitz constant of li w.r.t ‖ · ‖2 (Lemma 2.6 in Shalev-Shwartz et al. [22]), and li is
Lipschitz continuous when the data point x has bounded norm. Therefore, utilizing Corollary A.3.1,
we have the logarithmic regret bound of our algorithm as
Regret(AFTL, Sθp , T ) ≤ α(T ) =
G2
2
(1 + log T ) ≤ O(log T ).
We next provide the proof of the certified lower bound (restating Theorem 4.2 from Section 4.3):
Theorem 4.2. Given a target classifier θp, to reproduce θp by adding the poisoning set Dp into Dc,
the number of poisoning points |Dp| cannot be lower than
sup
θ
c(θ) =
L(θp;Dc)− L(θ;Dc) +NCR(R(θp)−R(θ))
supx,y
(
l(θ;x, y)− l(θp;x, y)
)
+ CR(R(θ)−R(θp))
.
The main intuition behind the theorem is, when the the number of poisoning points added to the
clean training set is lower than the certified lower bound, for structural empirical risk minimization
problem (shown in (1) in the main paper), then target classifier will always have higher loss than
another classifier and hence cannot be achieved.
Proof. We first show that for all models θ, we can derive a lower bound on the number of poison
points required to get θp. Then since these lower bounds all hold, we can take the maximum over all
of them and get a valid lower bound. We first show that for any model θ, the minimum number of
poisoning points cannot be lower than
c(θ) =
L(θp;Dc)− L(θ;Dc) +NCR(R(θp)−R(θ))
supx,y
(
l(θ;x, y)− l(θp;x, y)
)
+ CR(R(θ)−R(θp))
.
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Let us denote the point corresponding to the supremium of the loss difference between θ and θp as
(x∗, y∗) 3. Namely, l(θ;x∗, y∗)− l(θp;x∗, y∗) = supx,y
(
l(θ;x, y)− l(θp;x, y)
)
. Now suppose we
can obtain θp with lower number of poisoning points c < c(θ). Assume there is a poisoning set Dp
with size c such that when added to Dc would result in θp. We have
sup
x,y
(
l(θ;x, y)− l(θp;x, y)
) ≥ 1|Dc ∪ Dp|L(θ;Dc ∪ Dp)− 1|Dc ∪ Dp|L(θp;Dc ∪ Dp)
> CR ·
(
R(θp)−R(θ)
)
,
implying supx,y
(
l(θ;x, y)− l(θp;x, y)
)
+CR · (R(θ)−R(θp)) > 0. Based on the assumption that
c < c(θ), and the fact that supx,y
(
l(θ;x, y)− l(θp;x, y)
)
+ CR · (R(θ)−R(θp)) > 0, we have
c · (l(θ;x∗, y∗)− l(θp;x∗, y∗) + CR(R(θ)−R(θp)))
< c(θ) · (l(θ;x∗, y∗)− l(θp;x∗, y∗) + CR(R(θ)−R(θp)))
= L(θp;Dc)− L(θ;Dc) +NCR(R(θp)−R(θ)).
where the equality is based on the definition of c(θ). On the other hand, by definition of (x∗, y∗) for
any Dp of size c, we have
L(θ;Dp)− L(θp, Dp) + c · (CR ·R(θ)− CR ·R(θp))
≤ c · (l(θ;x∗, y∗)− l(θp;x∗, y∗) + CR(R(θ)−R(θp))).
The above two inequality imply that for any set Dp with size c we have
1
|Dc ∪ Dp|L(θ;Dc ∪ Dp) + CR ·R(θ) <
1
|Dc ∪ Dp|L(θp;Dc ∪ Dp) + CR ·R(θp).
which indicates that adding Dp poisoning points into the training set Dc, the model θ has lower loss
compared to θp, which is a contradiction to the assumption that θp has lower loss on Dc ∪Dp and can
be achieved. Now, since θp needs to have lower loss on Dc ∪ Dp compared to any classifier θ ∈ Θ,
the best lower bound is the supremium over all models in the model space Θ.
B Relating -closeness to closeness of parameters
In theorem below, we show how one can relate the notion of -closeness in Definition 1 in the main
paper to closeness of parameters in the specific setting of hinge loss. We use this just as an example
to show that our notion of -closeness can be tightly related to the closeness of the models.
Theorem B.1. Consider the hinge loss function l(θ;x, y) = max(1−y · 〈x, θ〉, 0) for θ ∈ [−1,+1]n
and x ∈ [−1,+1]n and y ∈ {−1,+1}. For θ, θ′ ∈ [−1,+1]n such that ‖θ‖1 ≤ R and ‖θ′‖1 ≤ R
for some R ≥ 1, if θ is -close to θ′ in the loss based distance, for some  ≤ 1 then, ‖θ− θ′‖1 ≤ R · .
Remark 4. In Theorem B.1 above, a naive upper bound on the norm of θ and θ′ is n, however, the
models that we care about in practice usually have much smaller norm because of the regularization.
Proof. We construct a point x∗ as follows:
x∗i =
{− 1R , if θi > θ′i, i ∈ [n]
+ 1R if θi ≤ θ′i, i ∈ [n]
Then we have
〈θ − θ′, x∗〉 = 1
R
· ‖θ − θ′‖1 (3)
Since ‖θ‖1 ≤ R we have
〈x∗, θ〉 ≥ −1 (4)
and similarly since |θ′| ≤ R we have
〈x∗, θ′〉 ≥ −1. (5)
3In practice, the data spaceX is a closed convex set and hence, we can find (x∗, y∗) using convex optimization.
In other words, as we saw in experiments, calculating the lower bound is possible in practical scenarios.
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(a) Max Loss Difference to Target (b) Euclidean Distance to Target
Figure 3: Attack convergence (results shown are for the target classifier of error rate 10%). The
maximum number of poisons is set using the 0.1-close threshold to target classifier
Therefore by Inequalities (4) and (5) we have
l(θ;x∗,−1)− l(θ′;x∗,−1) = max(1 + 〈x∗, θ〉, 0)−max(1 + 〈x∗, θ′〉, 0) = 〈θ − θ′, x∗〉
which by Equation (3) implies
l(θ;x∗,−1)− l(θ′;x∗,−1) = 1
R
· ‖θ − θ′‖1.
Now since we know that, ∀x ∈ [−1,+1]n, the loss difference between θ and θ′ is bounded by , the
bound should also hold for the point (x∗,−1), meaning that
1
R
· ‖θ − θ′‖1 ≤ 
which completes the proof.
C Indiscriminate Poisoning Attacks
In this section, we evaluate the attacks in the conventional indiscriminate attack setting, where the
attacker’s goal is just to reduce the overall accuracy of the model.
Datasets and Models. For the indiscriminate attack, we use the MNIST-17 dataset, which consists of
the digits 1 and 7 and is commonly used for evaluating indiscriminate poisoning attacks against binary
classification [24, 2, 26]. The MNIST-17 dataset contains 13007 training data and 2163 test data. The
dataset contains 784 features and all the features are normalized into range [0, 1]. For completeness,
the Adult dataset used for subpopulation attack is downsampled to form a class-balanced dataset and
contains 15682 training data and 7692 test data. The dataset contains 57 features and the features are
also normalized into range [0, 1] (except for the binary features). All of the processed datasets are
included in the supplementary material. We still adopt linear SVM model in the indiscriminate attack
scenario. All of the models for both datasets set the regularization parameter CR = 0.09. We choose
the hyperparameters by some simple grid search. All the experiments can be run on personal laptops
without additional computing resources.
Target Classifiers. Accuracy of the clean MNIST-17 model has around 1% error rate on the test set.
For our experiment, we aim to generate three target classifiers with overall test accuracies around 5%,
10% and 15%. To generate target classifiers with desired error rates, we follow the heuristic strategy
proposed by Koh et al. [9] to generate multiple candidate target classifiers, and then among all the
valid candidate models that satisfy the error rate requirement we choose the one with lowest loss
on the clean training set. Using this approach, the final target classifiers induced have overall test
accuracy of 94.0%, 88.8% and 83.3% respectively. (We describe a better way of finding the target
classifiers in Appendix C.1, but for comparison purposes do not use those in the results here.)
Convergence. We show the convergence of Algorithm 1 by reporting the maximum loss difference
and Euclidean distance between the classifier induced by the attack and the target classifier. Figures 3a
and 3b summarize the results for the target classifier with a 10% error rate. The maximum number of
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(a) 5% Error Rate (b) 10% Error Rate (c) 15% Error Rate
Figure 4: Test accuracy for each target model of given error rate with classifiers induced by poisoning
points obtained from our attack and the KKT attack.
5% Error 10% Error 15% Error
# of Poisons 1737 5458 6192
Lower Bound 874 3850.4 ± 0.8 4904
Table 2: Theoretical lower bounds on the number of poisoning points needed to achieve classifiers
induced from our attack for different target errors. All results are averaged over four runs. An integral
value in a cell means we get exactly that same value for all four runs; for the one cell where we
observe variation, we report the average and standard error.
5% Error 10% Error 15% Error
# of Poisons 1737 5458 6192
Lower Bound 856 4058.4+1.4 5031.4+4.8
Table 3: Theoretical lower bounds on the number of poisoning points needed to achieve classifiers
induced from the KKT attack for different target errors. All results are averaged over 4 runs, integer
value in the cell means we get exactly same value for 4 runs and others are shown with the average
and standard error.
poisoning points in the figure is obtained when the classifier from Algorithm 1 is 0.1-close to the
target classifier in the loss-based distance. In Figure 3, the classifier induced by our algorithm steadily
converges to the target classifier both in the maximum loss difference and Euclidean distance, while
the classifier induced by the KKT attack diverges initially and then starts to converge to the target
model. At the maximum number of points, the maximum loss difference of KKT-induced classifier to
the target is 0.46, compared to 0.1 for the classifier induced by our attack. For the Euclidean distance,
the KKT-induced classifier is 0.16 away, compared to 0.07 for the classifier induced by our attack.
Attack Success. We next compare the classifier induced from our attack to the classifier induced by
the KKT attack in terms of their overall test accuracy. Similarly, the maximum number of poisoning
points in Figure 2 is obtained by running our attack with 0.1-closeness (in loss based distance) to
the target as the input. In terms of the test accuracy, our attack has a comparable attack success
rate compared to the KKT attack. Specifically, for target models of 5% and 10% error rates, both
methods have almost identical performance, as shown in Figures 4a and 4b. For the target model of
15% error rate (test accuracy is 83.3%), the KKT attack is more successful than our attack, inducing
models with 82.7% accuracy (17.3% attack success rate) compared to 85.9% accuracy (14.1% attack
success rate) for our attack. Interestingly, in this case, the performance of models induced by the
two attacks with fewer poisoning points our attack results in models with lower test accuracy (higher
attacker success) than the KKT attack. To summarize, for the indiscriminate scenario, our attack
produces classifiers that have much closer distance to the target models than the KKT attack, and has
comparable attack success rates with the KKT attack.
Lower Bound on Number of Poisons. We next check the optimality of our attack in the indiscrimi-
nate attack scenario. Similar to the subpopulation attack setting, we still use Theorem 4.2 to compute
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(a) 5% Error Rate (b) 5% Error Rate (c) 15% Error Rate
Figure 5: Lower bound computed in each iteration of running algorithm 1 when the target classifier of
the algorithm is the classifier induced from our Attack (classifier in Table 2). The maximum number
of poisons is set using the 0.1-close threshold to classifier induced from our attack.
(a) 5% Error Rate (b) 5% Error Rate (c) 15% Error Rate
Figure 6: Lower bound computed in each iteration of running algorithm 1 when the target classifier
of the algorithm is the classifier induced from the KKT Attack (classifier in Table 3). The maximum
number of poisons is set using the 0.1-close threshold to KKT induced classifier.
the lower bound of the induced classifier from our attack by using it as the input to Algorithm 1,
and terminating when the induced classifier is 0.1-close to the given target model. Our calculated
lower bound shows that there exists a relatively large gap between the number of poisoning points,
especially for the induced classifier from our attack for the target model of 5% error rate, where the
lower bound is only 50% of the actual number of poisoning points used. For the induced classifier for
the target model of 15% error rate, the gap between the number of poisoning points and the lower
bound is smallest, with the lower bound taking 79% of the number of poisoning points. The relatively
large gap indicates that either the estimated lower bound is not tight or the attack itself is not close to
optimal. To gain more insights into this problem, we further show the computed lower bound at each
iteration when running Algorithm 1 and Figure 5 summarizes the results. From the Figure, we see
that, the peak value of the curve (i.e., highest lower bound) always appears before the termination
of the algorithm, indicating that the computed lower bound is likely to be tight and we may need to
further improve the attack algorithm.
For completeness, we also repeat the lower bound computation process for classifiers induced from
the KKT attack. The KKT induced classifiers are obtained by running the KKT attack with target
classifiers of different error rates as target input. The target number of poisoning points of KKT attack
is given by the size of poisoning set returned from our attack when our algorithm terminates when
the induced classifier is 0.1-close to the target model of different error rates. Then the lower bound
computation process is identical to the above – we simply send the KKT induced classifier as target
input to Algorithm 1 and terminate it when the induced classifier from our algorithm is 0.1-close
to the given target model (i.e., KKT induced classifier). The results are summarized in Table 3 and
we observe that there also exists a relatively large gap between the lower bound and the number of
poisoning points used by the attack. Similarly, we also plot the lower bound computed at different
iterations of Algorithm 1 in Figure 6, and find that the peak value also appears before the termination
of the algorithm, indicating that the lower bound might be tight and we need a stronger attack strategy
to close the gap.
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Target Models Test Acc (%) Loss on Clean Set # of PoisonsOriginal Improved Original Improved Original Improved
5% Error 94.0 94.9 2254.6 1767.1 2170 1340
10% Error 88.8 88.9 4941.0 3233.1 5810 2432
15% Error 83.3 84.5 5428.4 4641.6 6762 3206
Table 4: Comparison of Two Target Generation Methods on Number of Poisoning Points Used to
Reach 0.1-closeness to the Target. Original indicates the original target generation process from Koh
et al. [9]. Improved denotes our improved target generation process with adaptive model updating.
(a) 5% Error Rate (b) 10% Error Rate (c) 15% Error Rate
Figure 7: Test Accuracy with classifiers obtained from our attack and KKT attack. Target model
for KKT attack is generated from the original generation process and target model for our attack is
generated from the improved generation process. Maximum number of poisoning points is obtained
by running our attack with target model generated from the original process and resultant classifier is
0.1-close to the target.
C.1 Improved Target Generation Process
The original heuristic approach works by finding different quantiles of training points that have higher
loss on the clean model, flipping their labels, repeating those points for multiple copies, and adding
them to the clean training set. We find that, in the process of trying different quantiles and copies of
high loss points, if we also adaptively update the model where the high loss points are found (instead
of just always fixing it to be the clean model), we can generate a valid target classifier with even lower
loss on the clean training. Such an improved generation process can significantly reduce the number
of poisoning points needed to reach the same -closeness (with respect to the loss based distance) to
the target classifier, consistent with the claims in Theorem 4.1 in the main paper. In addition, we find
that, if we compare our attack with improved generation process to the KKT attack with the original
generation process [9], we can also reach the desired target error rate much faster using our attack.
Results. We first empirically validate Theorem 4.1 in the main paper. Obtaining the same -closeness
in loss-based distance, a target classifier with lower loss on the clean training set Dc requires fewer
poisoning points. Therefore, when adversaries have multiple target classifiers that satisfy the attack
goal, the one with lower loss on clean training set is preferred. This also reduces the risk of detection
by the model owner.
For both the original and improved target generation methods, we generate three target classifiers with
error rates of 5%, 10% and 15%. The original target classifier generation method returns classifiers
with test accuracy of 94.0%, 88.8% and 82.3% respectively (also used in the previous experiments
of indiscriminate attack). The improved target generation process returns target classifiers with
approximately the same test accuracy (94.9%, 88.9% and 84.5%). However, for classifiers returned
from the two generation methods of same error rate, the improved generation method produces
classifiers with significantly lower loss compared to the original generation approach.
Table 4 compares the two target generation approaches by showing the number of poisoning points
needed to get 0.1-close to the corresponding target model of same error rate. For example, for target
models of 15% error rate, the model from the original approach has a total clean loss of 5428.4 while
our improved method reduces it to 4641.6. With the reduced clean loss, getting 0.1-close to the target
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model generated from our improved process only requires 3206 poisoning points, while reaching the
same distance from the target model produced by the original method would require 6762 poisoning
points, a more than 50% reduction.
Figure 7 compares the two attacks in an end-to-end manner in terms of their test accuracy. With the
improved target generation process, our attack can achieve the desired error rate more efficiently than
the KKT attack with original process. For the KKT attack with target model from original process,
we determine the target number of poisoning points using the size of poisoning set returned from
running Algorithm 1 with 0.1-closeness and target model from original process as inputs. To run our
attack with improved generation process, we terminate the algorithm when the size of the poisoning
points is same as the number of poisoning points used by the KKT attack with original process. Such
a termination criteria helps us to ensure that both attacks use same number of poisoning points and
can be compared easily. We also evaluate the KKT attack on fractions of the maximum target number
of poisoning points (0.2, 0.4, 0.6, and 0.8), as in the previous experiments. The accuracy plot shows
that our attack (with improved target model) can achieve the desired error rate (e.g., 10%) much faster
than the KKT attack (with original target model), especially for the target classifiers of error rates of
10% and 15%.
D Comparison of Model-Targeted and Objective-Driven Attacks
Model-targeted and objective-driven attacks have significantly different attack goals: the former
aims to induce the target classifier while the latter aims to achieve the attacker objective such as
increasing overall error rate in indiscriminate setting. Therefore, the two types of attacks are not
directly comparable. However, the model-targeted attacks can also perform well in the attacker
objective of objective-driven attacks, but requires providing a “better" target model. Here, we provide
some observations of a “better" target model when one is interested in comparing the model-target
attacks (e.g., the attack proposed in this paper) to some objective-driven attacks in indiscriminate
attack scenario. In the indiscriminate setting, we observe that, in order for our model-targeted attacks
to have same accuracy drops using less number of poisoning points, the target model needs to have
larger error rate. For example in sufigures 7a and 7c, if the adversary aims to get a classifier that
has error rate around 5%, then choosing a target classifier of 5% error rate can reach the desired
5% error rate using approximately 1500 poisoning points. In contrast, if the adversary uses a target
classifier of 15% error rate, the same 5% error rate can be achieved using only 500 poisoning points.
Therefore, for our attack, choosing a target classifier of higher error rate can produce the classifier of
the desired error rate using much lower number of poisoning points. Similar observation is also found
for the KKT attack when comparing it with other strong objective-driven attacks (e.g., the min-max
attack [24]) in indiscriminate setting [9]. Specifically, Koh et al. [9] generate multiple target models
with varying error rates and run the KKT attack with each of the target models. Then among all the
target models, they choose the one with which the KKT attack can reduce the overall classification
accuracy most. Generally, the chosen target classifier at the end is the one with much larger error rate.
21
